BSI Luxembourg ASBL
Château de Wiltz
Specialist in econometrics, with a Master II in Audit and Inspection, certified in Internal Audit (CIA) and in Risk Management and Insurance (CRMA) ) as well as Internal Controls auditor (CICA), Dramane Sidibe has around thirty years of transversal managerial experience in the para-public and private sectors in Mali, particularly in the areas of banking, finance, and food security.
He has also worked for several years in Malian institutions of higher education as a lecturer and as an expert for international conferences. Dramane Sidibe began his Executive DBA in 2015 in order to bring a scientific perspective to his professional experiences.
Le rôle de la gouvernance dans le système de management des risques : Cas d’un échantillon des Banques maliennes.
[The role of the governance in risk management systems: A case study of Malian Banks]
This research looks at the contribution and the influence of the Board of Directors on the risk management system. It aims to examine the influence of the structures and characteristics of the Board of Directions on the exposure of the banks of Mali to risks, as well as the conditions and the climate of that board's decision-making process.
The study, based on a multi-method approach (quantitative and qualitative analyses), was carried out on a sample of ten (10) banks from 2008 to 2015. It is based on the theory of the agency, as well as other theories (cognitive, behavioral, resource dependency, etc.). The results obtained are close to those of Bailey (2012), Forbes and Milliken (1999).
From this collaboration, the research identifies that the skills in accounting, governance and risks negatively influence the global evaluation of governance. On the other hand, the Board's oversight roles, standard efforts and the skills of the finance and audit administrators have a positive influence on the overall governance assessment.
The study also found that the bank's exposure to risk remains weak when its Board of Directors, exercising its supervisory role, includes competent directors in finance. On the other hand, exposure to risk increases when the Board has expertise in strategy.
The skills of the directors, in particular in terms of risk management, and the role of control of the board, have act negatively on the ROE. On the other hand, their competence in strategy and that of the Audit Committee play a positive role in the ROE. The competence in marketing and the cognitive conflict negatively affect the profitability of assets contrary to the skill in audit.
Finally, our research opens up new avenues for the realization of studies on banks with different ownership structures.